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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a straightforward application of prior precedent. In First Security Bank 
of Idaho, NA. v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d 683 (1988), this Court held that the trust deed 
antideficiency statute did not shield guarantors from claims against them for the balance due 
after a foreclosure sale. 115 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d 683 (1988). Here, the district court relied on 
Gaige in entering judgment against the Guarantors. Now, the Guarantors seek to avoid their 
contractual obligations and sidestep Gaige by reading a meaning into the judicial foreclosure 
antideficiency statute that is not there, and by rehashing policy arguments that this Court has 
already rejected. 
The precedent of Gaige, the plain language of LC. § 6-108, the public policy of this state, 
and the statute's legislative history all lead to the conclusion that the district court reached in this 
case-the Guarantors are not saved by the antideficiency statute. And, even if they were, the 
language of the guaranty agreements preclude the statute's application. For these reasons, this 
Court should affirm the district court' s judgment against the Guarantors. 
B. Facts 
In 2007 and 2008, Gordon Paving Company, Inc., Northwest Sand & Gravel, Inc., and 
Blackrock Land Holdings, LLC ( collectively, "Gordon Paving") borrowed a total of $10 million 
from AgStar Financial Services, ACA ("AgStar"). (R. 9-10.) Gordon Paving executed separate 
mortgages and security agreements on its real and personal property. (R. 9-10, 37-48.) The 
indebtedness was also secured by separate guaranty agreements executed by the Craig Hansen 
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GPC Nevada Trust; the Carol Hansen GPC Nevada Trust; Brandon Hansen, individually; and 
Brian Hansen, individually ( collectively, "the Guarantors"). 1 (R. 21 -36.) 
Under these agreements, the Guarantors agreed to "irrevocably, absolutely, and 
unconditionally" guarantee the full payment of Gordon Paving' s obligation to AgStar. (R. 22 
,r 1.) The Guarantors also waived most defenses, including the release of Gordon Paving, and 
gave AgStar the ability to enforce its rights against the Guarantors or Gordon Paving as it saw fit. 
(R. 22 ,r,r 2-3.) The Guarantors agreed that if AgStar pursued foreclosure, it was only required to 
apply the net proceeds of the sale to the total indebtedness to determine the outstanding 
obligation owed by the Guarantors. (R. 22 ,r 3.) 
Gordon Paving defaulted, AgStar sued for foreclosure, and on June 19, 2013, a Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure was entered against Gordon Paving in Twin Falls County Case No. 
CV 12-2731.2 (R. 10.) AgStar liquidated the real property of Gordon Paving via sheriff's sale in 
November 2013. (Id.) AgStar moved for a deficiency judgment, but that motion was denied. (Id.) 
In addition, AgStar has liquidated all of the personal property collateral that it could locate. 
(R. 11.) After liquidation, Gordon Paving still owes over $2,732,241.40 as of October 12, 2015, 
not including fees and costs incurred since February 10, 2015. (R. 116-18.) 
C. Procedural History 
On June 1, 2015, AgStar sued the Appellants on a number of theories, including Breach 
of Personal Guaranty against the Guarantors. (R. 13-14.) In suing for breach of personal 
guaranty, AgStar sought to recover the leftover indebtedness from the Guarantors. Id. 
1 Brandon Hansen declared personal bankruptcy after AgStar filed its complaint. AgStar 
does not seek to recover against Brandon Hansen in this litigation. 
2 The foreclosure case was the subject of another appeal before this Court (Docket No. 
42932). This case is sub Judice. 
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The Guarantors were served with the complaint on June 8, 2015. (R. 70-73.) Twenty-one 
days later, on June 29, 2015, counsel for the Guarantors filed their Notice of Appearance. (R. 57-
58.) AgStar filed and served a Notice of Intent to Take Default Against Defendants on June 30, 
2015. (R. 59-61.) On July 7, 2015, despite having had ample time to respond, the Guarantors 
failed to answer, and AgStar filed the Application for Entry of Default Pursuant to IRCP 55. (R. 
62-64.) Upon this application, the district court entered an Order for Default on July 9, 2015. (R. 
75-76.) 
On July 15, 2015, the Guarantors filed a Motion to Set Aside Default. (R. 82-83.) Despite 
the default, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss that same day. (R. 77-81.) The Motion to Dismiss 
was premised on the affirmative defense that AgStar's claims were barred by res judicata. (R. 
77-81.) 3 AgStar opposed both of these motions. (R. 97-115.) The Guarantors also filed an 
answer, alleging the affirmative defense that the anti-deficiency statute, and AgStar's lack of a 
deficiency judgment, satisfied any balance remaining on the debt. (R. 126.) 
On October 19, 2015, the district court heard the motions. (Tr. Oct. 19, 2015.) The 
district court declined to set aside the default, holding that there was no meritorious defense 
shown. The district court held that res judicata did not bar a claim on the guaranties, and that the 
"antideficiency statute does not preclude a separate and distinct action by guarantors to enforce a 
debt." (Tr. 33: 22-24.) Based on this holding, as well as AgStar's affidavit of amounts due on 
judgment (R. 116-120), the district court entered a judgment against the Guarantors on the cause 
of action of Breach of Personal Guaranties for $2,732,241.40. (R. at 128-30.) AgStar agreed to 
dismiss the other claims with prejudice, as the judgment amount on the guaranties represented 
the total remaining indebtedness. (See Tr. at 34:7-24; 35:10-14.) 
3 Note that the Guarantors have abandoned the defense of res judicata on appeal. 
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On November 12, 2015, AgStar petitioned for its attorney fees and costs. (R. 131-34.) 
The Guarantors failed to file a timely objection or motion to disallow, and thus the district court 
granted the petition on December 18, 2015. (R. at 139-40.) On January 7, 2016, the district court 
entered an amended final judgment for the total amount of $2,760,111.90. (R. 142-44.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Issue No. 1 - Motion to Set Aside Default. In light of the precedent of Gaige, the 
antideficiency statute does not apply to a guarantor. The language of the guaranty agreement 
precludes application of the anti-deficiency statute. Wasn't the district court correct in denying 
Guarantors' motion to set aside default despite the defense of the antideficiency statute? 
Issue No. 2 - Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. After obtaining a judgment against 
the Guarantors, AgStar petitioned for its fees and costs under the language of the guaranties and 
J.C. § 12-120(3). The Guarantors failed to file a timely objection or motion to disallow. Wasn't 
the district court correct in awarding AgStar its fees and costs? 
Issue No. 3 -Attorney Fees on Appeal: AgStar seeks costs and attorney fees on appeal 
as authorized by I.AR. 40 and 41. AgStar bases its claim for fees on the guaranty agreements or, 
alternatively, LC. § 12-120(3). 
ID. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1 - A district court's refusal to set aside entry of default is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. E.g., Dorion v. Keane, 153 Idaho 371, 373, 283 P.3d 118, 120 (Ct. App. 2012). 
"Where the trial court makes factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, applies correct 
criteria pursuant to the applicable legal standards to those facts, and makes a logical conclusion, 
while keeping in mind the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases and resolution on the merits, 
the court will be deemed to have acted within its discretion." Id. (citations omitted). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 4 
Issue No. 2 - Awarding attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and 
subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 897, 104 P .3d 367, 
371 (2004). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Did Not Err in Holding That the Guarantors Have No 
Meritorious Defense, as I.C. § 6-108 Protects the Borrower, Not the Guarantor. 
The legal standard for a motion to set aside a default under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
55(c) is "for good cause shown." Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 552, 224 P.3d 1138, 1142 
(2010). Good cause includes a meritorious defense. Id. At 553, 224 P.3d at 1142. This policy 
recognizes that it would be an idle exercise and a waste of judicial resources for a court to set 
aside a judgment or entry of default if there is in fact no genuine justiciable controversy. Id. 
( citation and internal quotations omitted). 
The Guarantors' stated "meritorious defense" is the antideficiency statute: I.C. § 6-108. 
This defense then turns on the proper reading of the statute. Statutory analysis "must begin with 
the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court 
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! 
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). "This Court interprets statutes 
according to their plain, express meaning and resorts to judicial construction only if the statute is 
ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Arambarri v. 
Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 739, 274 P.3d 1249, 1254 (2012). "Where the language is 
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there 
is no occasion for a court to construe the language." Friends of Farm to Mkt. v. Valley Cnty. , 137 
Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (2002). "An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable 
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interpretation. An alternative interpretation that is unreasonable would not make it ambiguous." 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 896, 265 P.3d at 509. "If the statute as written is socially or otherwise 
unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 362 
P.3d 514, 519 (2015)(quoting In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 565, 567, 149 P.3d 840, 842 
(2006)). 
1. Gaige prohibits the interpretation offered by the Guarantors. 
The district court correctly interpreted the statute and declined to relieve the Guarantors 
from their contractual duties because of the precedent of First Security Bank of Idaho, NA v. 
Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d 683 (1988). In Gaige, a bank sought to collect from the Gaiges 
the amount due on promissory notes executed by their business. Id. at 173, 765 P.2d at 684. The 
promissory notes were secured by deeds of trust on the business' s building. Id. Gaige' s business 
defaulted, and the bank foreclosed and sold the building for less than the amount due under the 
notes. Id. The bank sued the Gaiges on the guaranties. Id. The Gaiges attempted to skirt their 
contractual duties on the grounds that the deed of trust antideficiency statute (I.C. § 45-1512) 
applied to guarantors. Id. This Court disagreed, holding that the antideficiency statute did not 
apply to guarantors: 
The first issue we address is whether our anti-deficiency statute, 
I.C. § 45-1512, applies to Gaige as a guarantor. Resolution of this 
issue had been reserved previously in Valley Bank v. Larson, 104 
Idaho 772, 663 P.2d 653 (1983). We decide it today, and we hold 
that it does not. 
I.C. § 45-1512 applies to claims by a creditor secured by a deed of 
trust for the balance due after a deed of trust sale. The protection in 
I.C. § 45-1512 is given to the borrower-grantor who gives the 
security interest described in the deed of trust. However, Gaige 
was not the borrower-grantor who gave the security interest 
covered by the deed of trust. The corporation, A.J. Gaige & 
Associates, Inc., was the borrower and grantor of the security. John 
Gaige merely guaranteed that debt. 
RESPONDENT' S BRIEF - 6 
115 Idaho at 174, 765 P.2d at 685. The Court concluded that the statute's language-set forth 
below--did not encompass guarantors: 
At any time within 3 months after any sale under a deed of trust, as 
hereinbefore provided, a money judgment may be sought for the 
balance due upon the obligation for which such deed of trust was 
given as security, and in such action the plaintiff shall set forth in 
his complaint the entire amount of indebtedness which was secured 
by such deed of trust and the amount for which the same was sold 
and the fair market value at the date of sale, together with interest 
from such date of sale, costs of sale and attorney's fees. Before 
rendering judgment the court shall find the fair market value of the 
real property sold at the time of sale. The court may not render 
judgment for more than the amount by which the entire amount of 
indebtedness due at the time of sale exceeds the fair market value 
at that time, with interest from date of sale, but in no event may the 
judgment exceed the difference between the amount for which 
such property was sold and the entire amount of the indebtedness 
secured by the deed of trust. 
I.C. § 45-1512. Under Gaige, then, a "money judgment ... for the balance due upon the 
obligation ... " cannot mean a judgment against a guarantor for the balance due-it can refer 
only to judgments against the principal obligor. Gaige clarifies that the trust deed antideficiency 
statute refers only to suits against the original borrower-grantor. 
2. The Plain Language ofl.C. § 6-108 Does Not Apply to Guarantors. 
Here, the Guarantors ask this Court to resurrect the Gaiges' argument. But the argument 
fails, as nowhere does the language judicial foreclosure deficiency statute protect a guarantor: 
No court in the state of Idaho shall have jurisdiction to enter a 
deficiency judgment in any case involving a foreclosure of a 
mortgage on real property in any amount greater than the 
difference between the mortgage indebtedness, as determined by 
the decree, plus costs of foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable 
value of the mortgaged property, to be determined by the court in 
the decree upon the taking of evidence of such value. 
LC. § 6-108. By latching on to a single phrase, the Guarantors attempt to distinguish Gaige, and 
extrapolate that the statute bars the entry of a judgment against them on the guaranty contracts. 
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This conclusion is incorrect. First, the term "deficiency judgment"-analogous to term 
"money judgment" in the trust deed antideficiency statute-does not apply to a judgment on a 
guaranty. While AgStar has not found an explicit statutory or case law definition of the term in 
Idaho, Black' s Law Dictionary defines "deficiency judgment" as follows: 
- deficiency judgment (1865) A judgment against a debtor for the 
unpaid balance of the debt if a foreclosure sale or a sale of 
repossessed personal property fails to yield the full amount of the 
debt due. - Also termed deficiency decree. 
JUDGMENT, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Under this definition, a "deficiency 
judgment" (like the term "money judgment" in Gaige) is against a debtor for the unpaid balance, 
not against a guarantor. The statute says that "No court in the state of Idaho shall have 
jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment . . . " I. C. § 6-108 ( emphasis added.) As with the trust 
deed version, the judicial foreclosure antideficiency statute only protects the borrower, not the 
guarantor. A judgment against the Guarantors on the separate guaranty contracts is not a 
deficiency judgment. There is no statutory or case authority allowing a lender to seek a 
deficiency judgment against a guarantor. 
And, the guaranty contracts are simply separate obligations from the mortgage, thus 
exempting the Guarantors from the statutory protections afforded to principal debtors. See 
Valley Bank v. Larson, 104 Idaho 772, 774, 663 P.2d 653, 655 (1983)(Trial court's conclusion 
that "[t]he Trust Deed Statutes protect the principal debtor, but the guarantor may not claim the 
protection because his obligation is independent of the principal debtor's" was well supported by 
persuasive case law (brackets in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
Generally, "[a] guarantee is an undertaking or promise on the part of the guarantor which is 
collateral to a primary or principal obligation and binds the guarantor to performance in the event 
of non-performance of the principal obligor." Indus. Inv. Corp. v. Rocca, 100 Idaho 228, 232, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 8 
596 P.2d 100, 104 (1979). A guaranty and a principal obligation are mutually exclusive. 
Mickelsen Constr., Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 404, 299 P.3d 203, 211 (2013). Thus, 
statutes that apply to the primary obligor do not automatically extend to protect obligors from 
their separate contractual undertakings. 
B. If I.C. § 6-108 Is Ambiguous, Public Policy and Legislative History Support the 
Interpretation that the Statute Does Not Cover Guarantors. 
As shown above, the plain language of the antideficiency statute is not ambiguous, and 
does not include the Guarantors within its scope. The Guarantors' interpretation of the statute is 
unreasonable, and should not subject the statute to statutory construction. See Pioneer Irr. Dist. 
v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho 593, 597, 288 P.3d 810, 814 (2012)(citing Payette River Prop. 
Owners Ass'n v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Valley Cnty., 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 
( 1999)("1f a statute is ambiguous because more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we look 
to rules of statutory construction for guidance.") 
But, to the extent that the Court is inclined to treat the statute as ambiguous, public 
policy, legislative history, and context support AgStar' s interpretation. See Pioneer Irr. Dist. , 
supra, at id. (citing State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999)("1n the event 
that this Court is required to engage in statutory construction, we may ascertain legislative intent 
from the statute's context, the public policy in support of the statute, and the statute's legislative 
history.") 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court has already rejected the public policy advanced 
by the Guarantors, and has determined that the best public policy is to leave 
any expansion of the antideficiency statute to the Legislature. 
The Guarantors cite several cases for the public policy that they should be protected from 
their contractual undertakings by the antideficiency statute. Their argument to this Court flies in 
the face of clear precedent. They cite First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. Shields, 730 P.2d 429, 
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431 (Nev. 1986) for the proposition that not extending the statute to guarantors would create a 
windfall for lenders. (App. Br. at 5.) This very case law and policy was already advanced and 
rejected in Gaige: 
While there may be arguments for extending anti-deficiency 
protection to guarantors, that action is for the legislature to do, not 
the court. In some states, such as Alaska, the legislature saw fit to 
extend protection to guarantors, AS § 34.20.100 (1985); at present 
ours has not. Although the Nevada court is apparently "convinced 
that it is unsound to deny guarantors the benefits of [anti-
deficiency] legislation," First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. Shields, 
730 P.2d 429, 431 (Nev.1986), a majority of state courts 
considering the issue have declined to expand the coverage of the 
statute to those not covered by the statute. See Bank of America 
National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hunter, 8 Cal.2d 592, 67 P.2d 
99 (1937); Bank of Kirkwood Plaza v. Mueller, 294 N.W.2d 640 
(N.D.1980); Riverside National Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438 
(Okla.1980). We deem it better policy to follow the wording of the 
statute and leave any expansion of coverage to the legislature. 
115 Idaho at 174-75, 765 P.2d at 685-86 (emphasis added). The Guarantors provide no reasoning 
for why this Court should reverse course on its prior case law and disregard the principles of 
stare decisis. See Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 
(1990)("When there is controlling precedent on questions of Idaho law ' the rule of stare decisis 
dictates that we follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be 
unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law 
and remedy continued injustice."') Nor do the Guarantors offer a sound policy reason to treat 
nonjudicial and judicial foreclosures differently. 
Other jurisdictions have also rejected the policy laid out in Shields. Recently, in Mutual 
of Omaha Bank v. Murante, 829 N.W.2d 676, 285 Neb. 747 (Neb. 2013), the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska rejected Shields. 829 N.W. 2d 676,684 (Neb. 2013). That court rejected Shields on the 
basis that the case failed to consider the separate obligation that the guarantor undertook 
contractually: 
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The cases Murante cites do not give sufficient weight to the 
separate obligations of the borrower and the guarantor. Instead, 
they conclude that guarantors are protected because the guaranty 
and the deed of trust secure the same obligation. 
Id. Indeed, as noted above, this Court has recognized that a guaranty and a deed of trust are 
separate contractual undertakings. E.g. , Valley Bank, 104 Idaho at 774, 663 P.2d at 655. 
Murante goes on to cite a litany of persuasive cases (including Gaige) for the proposition 
that because a guaranty is a contractual undertaking separate from the principal loan, the 
antideficiency statutes are inapplicable. 829 N.W. 2d at 684-85(citing Bank of America Nat. 
Trust & Savings Assn. v. Hunter, 8 Cal. 2d 592, 67 P.2d 99 (1937); National City Bank v. 
Lundgren, 435 N.W. 2d 588 (Minn. App. 1989)(The court focused on the observation that an 
unconditional guaranty is separate obligation from the principal loan); Bank of Kirkwood Plaza 
v. Mueller, 294 N.W.2d 640 (N.D. 1980)(Guaranty is separate contract not falling within the 
protections of the antideficiency statute.) 
Other courts have appreciated the distinction between the contractual duties of guarantors 
versus principal obligors, and have embraced the policy that the differing contractual duties 
support different applications of the antideficiency statutes E.g., LP XXVI, LLC v. Goldstein, 811 
N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)("The note was executed to provide capital, the mortgage to 
secure the note. Defendant personally provided the guaranty in order to assure the lender that any 
shortfall in the security provided by the mortgaged property would be made good."); 
Poughkeepsie Sav. Bank, FSB v. Harris, 833 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.N.C. 1993)(North Carolina 
statute allowing mortgagor, in suit for deficiency following mortgage foreclosure, to show as 
matter of defense and offset that property sold was fairly worth amount of debt secured by it or 
that amount bid was substantially less than true value is not available to guarantors, even when 
they are also the property owners, if they are sued to enforce their duties as guarantors.); and 
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Sumner v. Enercon Dev. Co. , 307 Or. 579, 584, 771 P.2d 619,621 (1989)("(A]n action on a debt 
is distinct from an action on a guarantee of that debt. Thus, raising a bar to one of the actions 
does not affect the ability to bring the other.") 
The Guarantors also marshal the support of Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1995). While Idaho has not passed judgment on this case, the Murante court did. As with 
Shields, the Murante court rejected the Utah Supreme Court's reasoning because that court 
"focused on the note of indebtedness and concluded that the antideficiency statute applied 
because both the deed of trust and the guaranty secured the note. This focus ignores the fact that 
the note and the guaranty are separate agreements involving different parties." 829 N.W.2d at 
684. And, Murante also rejected the Guarantors' other proffered case, First Interstate Bank v. 
Tatum and Bell, 821 P.2d 1384 (Ariz. App. 1991), on the same grounds. Id. 
2. The Legislative history of the statute supports AgStar's interpretation. 
The legislative history of the antideficiency statute also provides no relief to the 
Guarantors. In fact, it shows that the statute was intended to only apply to protect obligors in the 
foreclosure case-in-chief. The legislative preamble is as follows: 
AN ACT 
Prohibiting courts from entering a deficiency judgment in 
mortgage foreclosures in any amount greater than the difference 
between the mortgage indebtedness, plus costs of foreclosure, and 
the reasonable value of the mortgaged property; and declaring an 
emergency. 
S.L. 1933, ch. 150 § 1. Note that this statement says that courts may not enter a deficiency 
judgment in mortgage foreclosures without determining the reasonable value of the property. 
This language shows the statute was intended to protect borrowers in the foreclosure case-in-
chief. 
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And this statute was passed for the purposes of changing the common law. In 1930s 
America, states were scrambling to protect mortgagors from the vicissitudes of the Great 
Depression economy, and chose to legislatively protect mortgagors from the traditional rule 
allowing the mortgagee to be subject to a deficiency judgment. See Grant S. Nelson et al., 1 Real 
Estate Finance Law§ 8:3, Anti-deficiency Legislation (6th ed. 2014). This Court cannot presume 
that the legislature intended to apply the common-law altering statute to guarantors in addition to 
mortgagors. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478, 50 P.3d 488, 493 (2002)("We 
presume that the legislature did not intend to change the common law unless the language of a 
statute clearly indicates the legislature's intent to do so.")(citations omitted). Given this context 
of altering the common law, this statute cannot apply to the Guarantors. 
C. The Guaranty's Language Bars the Guarantors' Defense. 
This Court has repeatedly held guarantors to the language of their contracts. A guaranty 
agreement must be "enforced according to its literal terms." First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. 
Mountain View Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 158, 160-61, 730 P.2d 1078, 1080-81 (Ct. App. 1986), 
ajfd, 112 Idaho 1078, 739 P.2d 377 (1987)(citing Valley Bank, supra.); McGill v. Idaho Bank & 
Trust Co. , 102 Idaho 494,632 P.2d 683 (1981). In Valley Bank, this Court specifically held that a 
waiver of the antideficiency statute' s protection contained in a guaranty is effective. Valley Bank, 
104 Idaho at 774, 663 P.2d at 655, cited with approval by Gaige, 115 Idaho at 175, 765 P.2d at 
686. In McGill, the Court also held that the creditor could release the principal debtor without 
discharging the guarantor under the language of the guaranty agreement waiving the defense of 
release. 102 Idaho at 497-98, 632 P.2d at 686-87. 
The Guaranty Agreements in the present case make clear that they are separate 
obligations to be enforced apart from the foreclosure against the principal debtors. In addition to 
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waiving most defenses (including release), the Guarantors also agreed that AgStar would only 
apply the "net proceeds of any foreclosure sale to the obligation" : 
Investor may enforce this Guaranty without first proceeding 
against Issuer, any other guarantor, any other person or any 
security or collateral and without first pursuing any other right or 
remedy. This Guaranty remains enforceable regardless of any 
defenses which the Issuer may assert on the Obligations including 
but not limited to failure of consideration, breach of warranty, 
fraud, statute of frauds, bankruptcy, lack of legal capacity, statute 
oflimitations, Investor liability, accord and satisfaction, and usury, 
provided, however, that nothing herein shall waive Guarantor's 
right to assert in good faith payment or performance of any of the 
Obligations as a defense to a claim relating to such Obligations, to 
the extent of such payment or performance. If foreclosure or other 
remedy is pursued, only the net proceeds, after deduction of all 
charges and expenses, shall be applied to the amount due on the 
Obligations. Investor shall not be required to institute or prosecute 
proceedings to recover any deficiency as a condition of payment 
hereunder or enforcement hereof. Investor may purchase all or part 
of the collateral or security at any foreclosure or other sale for its 
own account and may apply the amount bid against the amount due 
on the Obligations. 
(R. 23)( emphasis added). This is an effective waiver of the antideficiency statute, which would 
require that AgStar apply the reasonable value of the property to the amount due. Even if the 
antideficiency statute applies, the Guarantors waived that protection, and the guaranties must be 
enforced according to their terms. 
D. The District Court Did Not Err in Awarding AgStar its Fees and Costs for 
Obtaining the Judgment. 
AgStar requested and was awarded its fees and costs under the language of the guaranty 
agreements [or alternatively under LC. § 12-120(3)] for its recovery against the Guarantors. (R. 
131-34.) The Guarantors failed to file an objection, and the court awarded the requested fees and 
costs. (R. 139-41.) The district court did not err in awarding AgStar its fees and costs, as AgStar 
was the prevailing party in recovering on the guaranties. 
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E. AgStar Should be Awarded its Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
AgStar requests and is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40 
and 41 and the language of the guaranties or under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, AgStar respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of 
the district court and award AgStar its attorney fees and costs in defending this appeal 
DATED: May 12, 2016. 
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